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Frederick Bernays Wiener
Overshadowed by Aloha Tower, and on the site of one of the twin
21-story Amfac Towers on the Fort Street Mall, there originated one of
the most memorable and unusual incidents of Hawaiian history.
Amfac Inc., now a billion dollar conglomerate, is the successor at one
remove to Hackfeld & Co. Ltd., which prior to 1918 was the center of
German influence in the Pacific. Seized by the Alien Property Custodian
in that year, Hackfeld & Co. was sold to a new group, American Factors
Ltd. Beginning in 1920, the expropriated former stockholders recovered
some or all of their seized property, after which they sued the purchasers,
contending that the sale price fixed in 1918 had been grossly inadequate,
that it was the result of a business conspiracy masquerading as patriotism.
After eight years of struggle in the courts, where all their contentions
were rejected, some of the former stockholders then sought to recoup
their claimed losses from the United States Government. In the course
of defending those new proceedings, the Government embarked on a
relentless search, laboriously assembling and arranging bits and pieces
of evidence from many persons in widely scattered places. Subsequently
the United States established in those and further lawsuits, extending
over another nine years, that the principal earlier recoveries had involved
extensive and artfully contrived frauds; that a subordinate official,
whose apparently fortuitous appearance on the scene was actually of
determinative weight, had earlier been corrupted; and that two future
Chief Justices of the United States, Secretary of State Charles Evans
Hughes and Attorney General Harlan Fiske Stone, had each made a
controlling mistake of law. The Government won its cases. But as the
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funds available were insufficient to satisfy the judgment in its favor, the
resultant deficiency was sought from the lawyer who had originally
orchestrated the fraudulent and corrupt scheme. That individual escaped
the first and most obvious hook, but his additionally fraudulent under-
payments of income tax got him in the end.
The tale just outlined, which begins with the extinction of German
influence in the Hawaiian Islands, has been inaccurately told, if at all,
in the many histories of the State of Hawaii. Even the house histories
of Hackfeld & Co.'s corporate successors, Kamaaina—A Century of
Hawaii, published by American Factors Ltd. in 1949, and Dynasty in
the Pacific, published for Amfac Inc. by McGraw-Hill in 1974, fail to
tell the whole story. For the complete version, resort must be had to the
sworn testimony and the documentary evidence adduced in a long series
of bitterly contested court cases. The present account is drawn from
those records.1
REORGANIZATION
Early days of Hackfeld. When Hawaii was annexed by the United
States in 1898, sugar was king—and nearly 90% of the sugar industry
was in the hands of a few factoring companies, the "Big Five." Those
concerns controlled the plantation companies, in most of which they
held stock. The factors could and did take a profit on nearly all merchan-
dise passing the plantations in both directions. They sold the plantations'
sugar at handsome commissions. They provided equipment and supplies
for them, taking a cut from both buyer and seller. Nearly every one of
those transactions involved not only shipping but insurance, and all of
the factoring companies had steamship and insurance agencies, which
provided still another source of income. They also acted as bankers for
the plantations, tiding them over hard times. And, until after World
War II, when the work force for the first time became unionized, it was
the Big Five that controlled Hawaii's economy.2
Three of the five were American in origin: Alexander & Baldwin, C.
Brewer & Co., and Castle and Cooke. A fourth, Theo. H. Davies & Co.,
where the British consulate was located, was British-owned.
The last of the Big Five, H. Hackfeld & Co. Ltd., was German-
owned.3 Founded by Captain Henry Hackfeld in 1849 as a merchandising
operation, it prospered and soon formed close and valuable ties with a
number of plantations. In 1881 the company was joined by Paul
Isenberg of Lihue on the island of Kauai; originally a trained agricul-
turalist, he applied his very considerable talents to the development of
sugar production. Prospering, he became an outstanding leader in the
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community, so much so that King Lunalilo created him a Noble of the
Kingdom.
Noble Paul favored the monarchy, overthrown in 1893, as against the
republic that succeeded it, and was then hostile to annexation, preferring
continued Hawaiian independence. Democracy was not to his liking; in
a still extant letter, he avowed that universal suffrage was the greatest
mistake of the 19th Century. After Hawaii became American in 1898,
Isenberg returned to Germany and in 1899 resumed German nationality.4
Dying in Bremen in 1903, he left a personal estate of $7,000,000.
Apart from the Isenberg interest, H. Hackfeld & Co. was a cozy
family party: virtually everyone who came out to join it was related by
either blood or marriage to someone already in the firm. After Noble
Paul's death, the concern was headed by John F. Hackfeld, a nephew of
the founder. Alone of all the Big Five, Hackfeld & Co. also had a retail
outlet, B.F. Ehlers & Co., originally operated by and named for another
of Captain Hackfeld's nephews. A brother-in-law, J. C. Pflueger, was
in charge of the firm's Bremen office. And when John Hackfeld returned
to Bremen in 1900, his successor both as executive in charge and as
German consul was still another cousin, George F. Rodiek.
The German consulate had been an adjunct of the firm since 1853,
after which the office of consul was regularly held by its resident head.
When the partnership was incorporated in 1897, to be housed in the
building then being erected at the corner of Fort and Queen Streets,
an edifice that was to stand for 70 years,5 the consular office was reached
by its own side entrance on Queen Street, and the arms of the German
Empire were carved in stone over that door.6 Regularly on the birthday
of Kaiser Wilhelm II, the German Consul hosted a reception for the
leaders of the community. Survivors years afterwards recalled the
occasion as a good party where champagne flowed—like champagne.
Although resident in Bremen after 1900, John Hackfeld regularly
commuted to Hawaii, and spent at least half of his time there until 1914.
He had a reservation to sail again in October 1914, but the outbreak of
war precluded further travel.
The effects of war. In Hawaii, the effects of the war were hardly felt
at first. The German gunboat Geier was interned in Honolulu in
November 1914 when it preferred semi-prisoner status to being out-
gunned and sunk by a Japanese cruiser hovering beyond the three-mile
limit. With the breach of diplomatic relations in February 1917, the
crew of Geier sabotaged their ship, whereupon the vessel was seized and
its officers and men placed in a stockade.
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Associated with Rodiek in the management of Hackfeld & Co. were
two other Vice-Presidents, J. F. Carl Hagens, also a relative of the
Hackfeld family, and John F. Humburg, in charge of the San Francisco
office. All three were American citizens, and, like their absent chief,
German born. Most of the department heads, also, had been born in
Germany. Rodiek was President of the Hawaiian Sugar Planters'
Association, the very essence and, indeed, the pinnacle of the Hawaiian
establishment.
Therefore, when the afternoon paper in Honolulu announced, in July
1917, that a federal grand jury in San Francisco had indicted Rodiek
and one of his consular employees for violation of the neutrality laws,
specifically of complicity in the German-Hindu plot, no one was much
excited. The notion of Germans hiring Hindus to subvert British rule
in India was fantastic. George Rodiek was apillar of the community; it
was unthinkable that a businessman of his stature could be a criminal.
His assurances of innocence were taken at full face value, and when he
sailed for San Francisco to attend the trial, all his friends saw him off
as though it were just another mainland trip.
Early in December 1917 came the explosion—actually two explosions,
but they were both so loud and followed each other so closely that many
bystanders heard only a single blast. At the commencement of the
German-Hindu trial, Rodiek changed his plea to guilty. The community
was aghast. Then the Honolulu Office of Naval Intelligence published
in the press excerpts from the diary of Captain Karl Grasshof, Imperial
German Navy, erstwhile commander of Geier. In those entries, the
methodical Teuton had recorded in detail his violations of the terms of
his internment, and his contacts and dealings with Consul Rodiek. It
made embarrassing reading when opened to public gaze, particularly
because it showed how closely Hackfeld & Co. had worked with official
German agencies. The interned sea-dog had ill repaid his hosts'
hospitality by pasting items on H. Hackfeld & Co. stationery into his
book of memorabilia.7 Again the community was shocked, this time into
a surge of angry heated feeling. The war was suddenly brought very
close.
Hackfeld & Co.'s business position was rendered precarious by the
combination of the two events. The revelations of the Grasshof diary,
coupled with the fact that some of the company's officers were German
nationals—enemy aliens—resulted in sharp restrictions on their use of
cables, a step that interfered substantially with their dealings in sugar.
Their retail store, Ehlers & Co., was boycotted by the buying public.
Their plantations threatened cancellation of the vital agency and factor-
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ing contracts. Rodiek was expelled from both business and social
organizations.
The value of the Hackfeld business lay in its earnings, not in its
assets, and its earnings were entirely dependent on good will. Now that
good will was well-nigh gone. All this was reported by Vice-President
Hagens in Honolulu to Vice-President Humburg in San Francisco.
Hagens was alarmed; Humburg was certain the matter would blow
over. At Hagens' insistence, Humburg came to Honolulu. Five minutes
in the city were sufficient to change his mind: an old friend cut him
dead on the street. He quickly came around to Hagens' way of thinking,
and reported to Rodiek that, "If German-controlled, we go to pieces,
or if we Americanize, we maintain our position."
The Americanization of Hackfeld & Co. Hagens was able to undertake
the Americanization process because of his unfettered control of John
Hackfeld's personal holding company, John F. Hackfeld Ltd., which
held just over a third of the H. Hackfeld & Co. stock; Hagens sold the
latter to a syndicate of local businessmen headed by Walter F. Dillingham.
The price was fixed by capitalizing the earnings of H. Hackfeld & Co.
at 12% over a ten year period, and taking the average of that figure; this
came to $180 a share, a figure in line with a number of recent private
sales. While the $180 figure did not take into account, on the plus side,
the tremendous war-time boom in sugar, it omitted as well, on the other
side of the ledger, the fact that in January 1918 the good will of the
concern was just about zero.
The sale made, the stockholders of H. Hackfeld & Co. met. The
officers and directors living in Germany, John Hackfeld and J. Carl
Isenberg (the elder son of Noble Paul) were removed from office. Also
eliminated were those of German nationality living in Honolulu and,
necessarily, Rodiek, too. Some department heads who had been too
outspokenly pro-German during the period of neutrality were also
dropped. New directors and officers, including Dillingham and Hagens,
were elected. No one at the meeting suggested that among those deposed
were Americans resident in Germany. Indeed, as Hagens testified later,
"They were all pretty meek."
All therefore seemed well—until the local representatives of the Alien
Property Custodian undertook to seize enemy property in Hawaii.
Under the newly adopted Trading with the Enemy Act, "enemy"
included everyone who was resident in an enemy country, regardless of
nationality or personal loyalty.8 But when Richard H. Trent, the
Custodian's man, reached the till of John F. Hackfeld Ltd., he found,
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not H. Hackfeld & Co. stock, but only the notes given by the Dillingham
syndicate.
All of this was duly reported to the Custodian, A. Mitchell Palmer,
who issued a one-word ultimatum to the reorganizers: "Unscramble!"
In Palmer's view, the January reorganization was an evasion of the law
because it effected a transfer of enemy interests to parties other than the
Custodian. Former Governor (and former Chief Justice) Walter F. Frear
made two trips to Washington to justify the action taken, but in vain;
Palmer was adamant. The word was "Unscramble," and, no other
course being available to them, the reorganizers did just that. The
January sales were rescinded; H. Hackfeld & Co. shares were replaced in
the John F. Hackfeld Ltd. box; and the Custodian, through Trent and
the Trent Trust Company, had effective control of the Hackfeld business.
With the aid of an advisory committee that included prominent
Honolulu businessmen from other sugar factors, the Custodian under-
took what he perceived to be the purpose of the law, namely, the
complete and permanent elimination of German influence and German
capital from any business conducted on American soil.
There were three possiblities. One, liquidation of the company, was
never seriously considered, because its earning value greatly exceeded
its asset value. A second method, the sale of the enemy shares at auction,
involved the possibility of resale to the former enemy owners after the
war. That ran counter to Palmer's view of the purpose of the law, and
moreover did not cover the case of the shares owned by Rodiek, who
was regarded by him as a tool of the Kaiser. The third, the course
adopted, was that Hackfeld & Co. would be sold to a new corporation
to be formed. By controlling the subscriptions to the stock of the new
company, the Custodian was able to eliminate any individuals he deemed
undesirable. Provisions for a five-year voting trust acted as a further
safeguard against future German control. All that was necessary was the
unanimous stockholders' vote that Hawaiian law prescribed when all the
assets of a solvent corporation were being sold.
The Custodian could count, first, on the shares that he held, either
directly or through John Hackfeld's holding company. Existing stock-
holders who were permitted to subscribe would not demur; there would
be no difference in substance. The only objection might come from those
of the Hackfeld & Co. stockholders whom Palmer was determined to
exclude. Palmer and his committee relented on some, but stood firm as
to others, notably George Rodiek. Ultimately, all of those whom Palmer
blackballed sent in their proxies—although later it was charged that
Rodiek had been threatened with denaturalization unless he did so.
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The German flag had figured prominently on the H. Hackfeld & Co.
stock certificates (see cover illustration). But in mid-1918, the climate
of opinion required that the new Hawaiian concern reflect war-time
sentiments. The company was therefore named American Factors Ltd.,
and its B. F. Ehlers store simultaneously became Liberty House—which
still flourishes under that name. In July 1918, by unanimous vote of the
H. Hackfeld & Co. stockholders, the company's assets, business, and
good will were sold to American Factors for $7,500,000. This came to
about $194 a share, nearly 8% more than the $180 figure fixed by the
January reorganizers.
The necessary corporate papers were soon signed, and the new
concern moved into its predecessor's building. Stonemasons with
hammer and chisel chipped away the Imperial German coat of arms
over the side door (already plastered over when the United States
became a belligerent), and the old company's name disappeared from
the front entrance. Those stonemasons brought to a close nearly seventy
years of association of the name of Hackfeld with the business life of the
Hawaiian Islands.
RECOVERY
Hackfeld's argument for American citizenship. Relative quiet succeeded
the sale to American Factors. What with the precipitous drop in the
price of sugar once the wartime boom collapsed, the new company had
problems of its own. The former Hackfeld & Co. officers all left for the
mainland. Hagens, who then served as a Captain in the Army, was really
returning to California, where he had been in business in 1913 when
John Hackfeld persuaded him to become a Vice-President in Hackfeld
& Co. Rodiek, pardoned by the President late in 1919, made a fresh
start in San Francisco. The others, too, were in business ventures of
one sort or another. Not a single one ever returned to Hawaii.
Slowly, as the emotions engendered by the war abated, Congress made
provision for the gradual return of seized enemy property. In 1920,
American citizens with war-time enemy status were allowed full
recovery.9 The younger J. C. Pflueger, son of Captain Hackfeld's
brother-in-law and his successor as manager of the Hackfeld & Co.
office in Bremen, Germany, took advantage of this boon, through
Charles E. Hotchkiss, a New York lawyer. Pflueger, born in Hawaii but
virtually a lifelong resident of Bremen, had guarded first his Hawaiian
citizenship and then his American citizenship.10
In 1923, by virtue of the Winslow Act, German nationals were allowed
to recover $10,000 of the principal amount of their seized property, plus
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$10,000 a year income from the balance remaining in the Custodian's
hands.11 Only then did John Hackfeld, acting through Hotchkiss, make
an effort to recover his property.
Later, in the summer of 1923, Hackfeld retained a new lawyer,
Reuben D. Silliman, through whom he requested the return, not simply
of $10,000, but of all his seized property, on the footing of asserted
American citizenship. But as the amount involved was well in excess of
$3,000,000, and because of problems arising from the Custodian's
handling of other war claims,12 Silliman was advised that Hackfeld's
claim would not be acted on until the claimant could establish American
citizenship through the State Department.
In November 1923, Hackfeld and Silliman appeared at the American
Consulate in Bremen, and filed Hackfeld's application for an American
passport. In that application, and in a long accompanying affidavit,
Hackfeld asserted that he had become a citizen of Hawaii in 1894 by
virtue of a Certificate of Special Rights of Citizenship; that he then
became an American citizen in 1900 through the collective naturalization
of all Hawaiians then effected by the Organic Act;13 that while he had
been forced to remove his wife to Germany in the same year because of
her health, his real home remained in Hawaii; and that his stay in
Germany during the war had been due to wartime restrictions, his wife's
health, and his own ill health. These papers went to the Department
with a favorable recommendation from U.S. Vice-Consul William G.
Roll.
The State Department lawyers who dealt with the case had no doubt
that the Certificate of Special Rights of Citizenship sufficed to make
Hackfeld a citizen of Hawaii; they had rulings of former American
Secretaries of State in similar instances to establish that point.14 No one
troubled to inquire in Honolulu about the situation now presented, or
to study the Republic of Hawaii's Constitution pursuant to which
Hackfeld's certificate had been issued. But they were troubled about the
presumption of expatriation that had arisen against Hackfeld by reason
of residence in the country of his birth for nine years.15 So they cabled
the Bremen consulate to ascertain how Hackfeld had been registered
with the German police.
The consulate replied, forwarding certificates made up by Dr.
Luerman, Bremen's Commissioner of Police. These showed that
Hackfeld had been registered since 1903 as a subject of Oldenburg, the
grand duchy of his birth. But Luerman explained that this was a mistake,
as Hackfeld had lost his German citizenship in 1888 by reason of more
than 10 years' absence from the Reich after 1877; under the German
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citizenship law, absence for more than 10 years effected automatic
expatriation.
The State Department was still not satisfied, and made further
inquiries of its Bremen consulate, as recently there had been encountered
numerous "mistakes" made by the authorities in Germany—all of them
before 1914, when the German police were perhaps the most thorough
and systematic in all Europe.16 Late in February 1924, decision was
made. U.S. Vice-Consul Roll, from Bremen, appeared in Washington
while on leave. Questioned at length about Hackfeld's behavior,
especially during the war, he reported favorably both orally and in
writing. On March 13, 1924, Hackfeld was issued an American passport,
one that bore the signature of the Secretary of State, Charles Evans
Hughes.
Armed with this passport, Hackfeld came to the United States. By
then, Alien Property matters had, for safety's sake, been placed in the
Department of Justice, where Hackfeld had a hearing. At its conclusion,
Attorney General Harlan Fiske Stone recommended allowance of the
claim, and, a few days later, on April 26, 1924, President Calvin Coolidge
signed it. Shortly thereafter, John Hackfeld was over three million
dollars richer.
The suit against American Factors. His fortune substantially restored,
Hackfeld went to San Francisco, where he rallied the former Hackfeld
& Co. stockholders, who had been awaiting his arrival and his advice.
With them he commenced a suit against American Factors, the members
of the reorganization committee, and Trent, alleging that the 1918 sale
of Hackfeld & Co. had been a fraudulent conspiracy, concocted under
cover of wartime emotions and pretended patriotism, to obtain the old
company's stock for far less than its true value. Instead of the sale price
of $7,500,000, the company was alleged to have been worth $17,500,000
in the summer of 1918; and complainants sought judgment for their
share of the difference of $10,000,000.
The suit for obvious reasons could not be tried in Honolulu, and by
agreement took place in San Francisco—over a period of several months.
Testimony taken on 112 court days resulted in a transcript nearly 15,000
pages long; bound up, the transcript occupied more than two and a half
feet of shelf space.17 Only a single incident of that massive forensic
effort deserves notice here: the comment of defending counsel that,
when former Vice-President Humburg, suing as an aggrieved stock-
holder, was confronted with the letters he had written in 1918, wherein
he had urged the fairness of the $180 price per share, he and the gardenia
in his buttonhole wilted simultaneously.18
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The trial over, the judge found as a fact that: "(i) no actual fraud on
the part of the respondents was shown; (2) no constructive fraud existed;
(3) the price paid was adequate." He also rejected the contention of
George Rodiek that his consent to the 1918 sale had been obtained by
duress. Appeals dragged on without success for the former Hackfeld &
Co. stockholders until April 1932. Four months later, John Hackfeld
died in Germany.
But—"He that complies against his will/Is of his own opinion still."
The belief that H. Hackfeld & Co. had indeed been undervalued in 1918
was embraced by Fredrick Rodiek, George's brother and John Hackfeld's
ancillary executor in New York. A private bill was introduced in the
United States Senate early in 1934, seeking the payment of $3,000,000
additional to the Hackfeld estate; this represented what the courts had
refused to award John Hackfeld in his lifetime, namely, the difference
between the $3,700,000 ultimately paid him by the Custodian, represent-
ing his share of the proceeds of the 1918 sale, and the claimed true value
of his seized Hackfeld & Co. stock. Under a convenient provision of law
then available, the bill was referred to the Court of Claims as a Congres-
sional Reference that proceeded like any other case in that tribunal,
except that no judgment could be entered at the end. The Court of
Claims would simply ascertain the facts and make an appropriate
recommendation to the house of Congress that had referred the matter
for determination.19
Fredrick Rodiek filed his petition on July 2, 1934, with Silliman as
counsel of record. In retrospect, this was the greatest mistake Silliman
and the Hackfeld estate ever made. The new proceeding sparked a
cross-suit by the United States that not only wiped out entirely Hackfeld's
American estate, but also set in train proceedings against Silliman
himself. The cross-suit exposed, 15 years after the event, the means by
which Silliman and Hackfeld had engineered the 1924 recovery.20
RETRIBUTION—PHASE ONE
Hackfeld and the problem of citizenship. Through his 1923-1924
representations, written and oral, John F. Hackfeld had convinced
officials of the United States that he had believed himself to be an
American citizen from 1900 on, and that his true home was Hawaii, his
presence in Bremen being simply a consequence of his wife's ill health.
Government counsel, headed by Harry LeRoy Jones, Chief Counsel of
the Alien Property Office of the Department of Justice, found otherwise,
however, when they undertook to defend the Court of Claims case, and
then to bring the cross-suit in New York against Hackfeld's estate for
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the overpayments made to Hackfeld. The evidence was overwhelming:
Hackfeld had never been an American citizen, and had never believed
that he was.
In the closing days of the Civil War, Hackfeld & Co.'s bark Harvest
had been captured and destroyed by the Confederate commerce raider
C.S.S. Shenandoah. Years later, in 1912, John Hackfeld testified in a
Court of Claims case that sought recovery for the loss. In that 1912
testimony Hackfeld said that he was a subject of the German Empire,
and that his residence was in Bremen. The following year, when Congress,
following ratification of the Sixteenth Amendment, enacted an income
tax law,21 Hackfeld duly filed a return. On that document, in his own
handwriting, he wrote, "Foreigner" and "Non-resident alien." On each
one of his commuting trips between Honolulu and Bremen between
1900 and 1914, Hackfeld carried Alien Certificates between Honolulu
and San Francisco, and on his voyages from Bremen to New York he
was invariably manifested as a German national.
One of Hackfeld's cousins, George B. Isenberg of Honolulu, was, in
May 1914, about to marry an American, a step that seemed to him to
warrant his own naturalization as an American citizen. But he was
reluctant to undertake that additional step until he had first consulted
his greatly admired relative, the President of Hackfeld & Co. John
Hackfeld said to George Isenberg, "I haven't found it necessary; why
should you?"
After the outbreak of war in 1914, Hackfeld, correctly surmising that
the same seizures of German property that Great Britain had already
effected would be duplicated by the United States once America were
to become a belligerent, directed transfers of his holding company stock
to relatives with American citizenship. But George Rodiek scotched
every possibility of success for that plan by ordering re-transfers so that
Hackfeld could receive his dividends. So it was that, when reorganization
became imperative in January 1918, the shares were in Hackfeld's name.
Following the war, when communication between the United States
and Germany could be resumed, Hackfeld and Hagens engaged in
extensive correspondence in which Hagens undertook to justify his 1918
actions, while Hackfeld insisted that his company had been the victim
of a business conspiracy cloaked in and hiding behind the banner of
patriotism. This correspondence showed Hackfeld to have been a
dedicated, patriotic German, belying his later representations that he
had deemed himself American since 1900.
Hackfeld's close associates also considered him to have been a German
and not an American. Hagens testified to that later. Humburg had
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sworn, in the report he submitted to the Custodian in January 1918,
that Hackfeld was a German, a characterization that made Humburg
squirm twenty years later in the witness chair. Nor was Humburg ever
able to square his "if we Americanize, we maintain our position" letter
with the subsequent Hackfeld party line that the head of the company
was an American citizen detained in Germany because of a wife unable
to tolerate Hawaii's climate. If Hackfeld had indeed been an American,
further Americanization would have been unnecessary. Nor had George
Rodiek entertained contrary views. In his 1919 application for a
Presidential pardon, he described Hackfeld & Co. as seized by the
Custodian "because its controlling stockholders were Germans living in
Germany." So counsel asked, "Who were the Germans living in Germany
that you mentioned in your pardon application?" Long silences ensued,
but ultimately Rodiek wyas driven to the painful admission that he must
have meant Hackfeld and the Isenbergs.22 The latter were also Silliman
clients in litigation then pending; the crass fraud perpetrated by one of
these, J. Carl Isenberg, will be briefly noted later.
Revealing also was the contrast between John Hackfeld and his first
cousin, J. C. Pflueger the younger. Both had desks in the Bremen office
of Hackfeld & Co. But while Pflueger appeared in the Bremen police
records as an American, Hackfeld was registered as an Oldenburger.
Pflueger went regularly to the American consulate; Hackfeld did not
appear there until November 1923, when he made application for an
American passport. Pflueger during the war was, necessarily, an enemy
alien vis-a-vis the Germans, and barely escaped having his property
seized by the German Custodian; Hackfeld was under no such disability.
Pflueger sought return of his property taken by the American Custodian
once Congress in 1920 had authorized relief for enemies who were
American citizens; Hackfeld took no action until 1923, when the
Winslow Act first provided partial restitution for enemies of German
nationality.23
When Mrs. Hackfeld was taken back to Bremen in 1900, Hackfeld
sold their Tantalus home and on his later commuting trips stayed with
his cousin Rodiek. But while investigation of American facts and records
was not difficult, it was otherwise when requests for documents were
sent through diplomatic channels to the Nazi government of Germany.
The State Department was often politely informed that the particular
document requested had been destroyed, but that in any event it
disclosed nothing concerning Hackfeld's citizenship.24
The apparent paradox was understandable. If the United States lost
its cross-suit, the $900,000 in the Hackfeld estate in New York would
26
pass to the Hackfeld heirs in Germany—which was shorthand for saying
that they got rentenmarks while the Nazi rulers acquired foreign
exchange. If the United States won, neither the Hackfeld heirs nor the
Nazis would get anything. The suspicions of Government counsel were
fully confirmed after World War II, when American military govern-
ment personnel found in official German files letters from the Hackfeld
lawyers in Bremen, urging that the authorities withhold information
regarding Hackfeld in the event inquiry should be made on behalf of
the United States.25
However, the German Foreign Office did furnish a beautifully photo-
graphed and elaborately certified and exemplified copy of Hackfeld's
resignation as consul, in which he stated that "On account of family
considerations, I am obliged in the future to make my residence in
Bremen." Transmission of that document did not mean for a moment
that the Nazis were suddenly reforming or going soft; it meant only that
the German Foreign Office lawyers were unaware of the American law
then in force that a document that said not a word about citizenship
still had a distinct bearing thereon. If Hackfeld had indeed been an
American citizen at that time, his change of permanent residence to the
country of his birth would have established a clear presumption of
expatriation.
Luerman's certificates. New discoveries were also made in respect of
Dr. Luerman's certificates that had proved so helpful to Hackfeld in
1923—24. One day while Dr. Luerman was away over lunch, the crack
Alien Property investigator, Captain H. E. Osann, obtained from one
of Luerman's subordinates a certification showing that there never was
any such expatriation by reason of ten-year absence as Luerman had
earlier put forward. To the contrary, the new data showed, first, that
Hackfeld had in fact returned to Germany just eight days before the
ten-year period expired, and, second, that he had been in possession of
a military reservist's passport when he left Germany, so that under
German law the period of expatriation never even began to run. Once
Osann obtained the new document, he rushed it to the American
consulate with the request that it be put in the diplomatic pouch, beyond
the reach of Dr. Luerman or of anyone else.26
There were other deficiencies in Luerman's certificates. During all of
the time that he had stated that Hackfeld had lost German citizenship
by expatriation, the Bremen records in his care still listed Hackfeld's
nationality as Oldenburg. Not until the American Consulate by direction
of the State Department made a second inquiry did Luerman change
the actual registration to "Nationality uncertain." Indeed, as a crowning
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touch of irony, Hackfeld did not appear in the Bremen records as an
American until 1924, 21 years after his original registration, and then
the entry was, "Citizenship U.S.A.—proved by possession of American
passport."
Dr. Heinrich Kronstein testified that, as a matter of German law.
Luerman had no authority either to execute his certificates or to initiate
changes in Hackfeld's registration. When Silliman objected that
Kronstein, a Baden lawyer, was not qualified to testify regarding
Bremen law, a Bremen lawyer, Dr. Ignatz Rosenak, was found among
New York City's hordes of German refugees to testify to the same
effect.27
The Americanism of Hackfeld & Co. It was also essential to demonstrate
the falsity of the Hackfeld-Silliman allegations that Hackfeld & Co. was
at all times 105% American in its outlook and activities, and that the
German consulate housed in its office was simply a commercial agency.
The first step was to find the Grasshof diary, that had so nearly blown
the company out of the water in November 1917. Inquiries at the Navy
Department proved fruitless, but the book was found, on a long off-
chance, in the War Department's G-2 files, along with some plaintive
letters from Grasshof seeking its return. The diary had been published
in the Honolulu papers by the local Office of Naval Intelligence, then
headed by a reservist, Lieut. William Todd. When he was scheduled for
demobilization, some time in 1919, Todd was advised that the Navy
Department intended to discontinue the Naval Intelligence Office in
Honolulu. Lieut. Todd took his papers across the corridor of the
Alexander Young Hotel, which then housed all service intelligence
agencies, and gave them to his opposite number, the Army's G-2. And
that was how the diary of Captain Karl Grasshof, late of the Imperial
Germany Navy, ultimately turned up in the War Department's files.28
With the use of that diary, the transcript of the German-Hindu trial,
and help from former officers and employees of H. Hackfeld & Co., the
true nature of the company could be shown. It was a Hawaiian corpora-
tion, and all three of its 1914 Vice-Presidents, Rodiek, Humburg, and
Hagens, were naturalized American citizens. Nevertheless, it was also
as much of an Imperial German outpost as any of the German colonies
then in the vast Pacific ocean. Its principal officers spoke German among
themselves, addressing each other with the intimate Du, even though
more and more native-born Americans came into their employ. Hackfeld
& Co. had bought Liberty Bonds, as Silliman and Hackfeld had
represented, but that was after America entered the war; before that,
the firm had subscribed to German War Loans.
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A fair index to the thinness of Hackfeld & Co.'s veneer of Americanism
was provided by Von Damm, head of its insurance department. He had
accompanied Hackfeld to Germany in the spring of 1914, and was in
Berlin when war broke out in August. This newly naturalized American
went straightway to the American Embassy to volunteer his services for
whatever the evacuation of the thousands of stranded vacationing
Americans might require. His offer was brusquely refused. Stung to the
quick, Von Damm went across the street and offered his services to the
German Foreign Office. The German diplomats were delighted, and
sent him to their legation in Norway. Von Damm remained there well
into the spring of 1915, an interval that became known in Honolulu as
"Von Damm's long vacation." For this service he received the thanks
of the German Kaiser,29 after which, during the remainder of the period
of neutrality, he became perhaps the most volubly outspoken pro-
German individual in the Honolulu community. In consequence, as
Hagens later put it, "There was an awful feeling towards Mr. Von
Damm among a number of people, more so than almost anyone else."
He was dropped in the January 1918 reorganization and left the islands
immediately, never to return.
German men-of-war. Earlier, in the fall of 1914, Admiral Von Spee
in his flagship Niirnberg put in at Honolulu, on his way to victory at the
Battle of Coronel and then to his own watery grave off the Falkland
Islands.30 While in Hawaii he obtained $50,000 from Hackfeld & Co.,
a sum duly reimbursed by the German Government. As the Grasshof
diary indicated, the company was in close touch with the gunboat Geier,
interned at Honolulu. A former company clerk established that Geier
was also in regular communication with another German gunboat,
Cormoran, interned at Guam. In the files of the disbanded War Trade
Board there was found a cable addressed to the latter vessel reading
"Execute Order Fackfeld," the last word obviously meaning "Hackfeld."
In fact, when the United States declared war against the German
Empire on April 7, 1917, Guam time, Cormoran was blown up by her
crew.31
But, who in Honolulu was competent to testify to the Guam link?
Prior to World War II Guam was a miniscule outpost that most people
never even knew existed and that only a very few persons had actually
seen. Returning by ship to the mainland following a series of depositions
taken from witnesses in Honolulu, a Government lawyer entertaining
some fellow passengers one evening regaled them, or so he thought, with
choice tidbits from the testimony he had just completed taking. When
he mentioned Guam, one of the party said he had been there.
29
"Did you know about the Cormoran?"
"Sure, I used to play bridge with her officers."
"Did you know about her being blown up ?"
"Hell, I saw her blow."
Counsel arranged to have his guest subpoenaed to testify to what he
had seen. When Silliman moved to strike that testimony as immaterial,
counsel stated on the record that the witness had been called solely
because of the Hackfeld estate's insistence that only one who had actually
been present on Guam on April 7, 1917, was competent to testify to the
fact of Cormoran's destruction. This caused Silliman, at the next recess,
to come over smiling to say, "The long arm of the F.B.I."—all the while
shaking his head.32 He never knew that the appearance of the Guam
witness simply illustrated what Justice Felix Frankfurther was later to
call, in his engaging oral history reminiscences, "the importance of
contingency."33
Hackfeld & Co.'s super-patriotic Americanism had fallen as had
Hackfeld's American citizenship. Later, on the witness stand in the
New York case, Silliman was forced to admit that he had stretched
matters. "There is a certain license due a lawyer in preparing a document
of that character and when they are not prepared by me I do not
meticulously correct the thing. . . . I remember at the time stating that
they were slightly overcolored. Lawyers have some scope and some
license in presenting matters to a court or a jury."
The role of Vice-Consul Roll. One other factual matter remained to be
investigated. Vice-Consul Roll, who had recommended approval of
John Hackfeld's passport application late in 1923, turned up in Washing-
ton a few months later, just when the application was under active
consideration in the State Department. There he had supplemented his
former written report with a personal interview, and both the files and
later conferences with the Department's legal advisers showed clearly
that this interview constituted the decisive factor in the granting of
Hackfeld's passport.
How was it that the Vice-Consul had so opportunely turned up at
such a crucial moment ? Was it simply a lucky break for an expropriated
former enemy? Was it purest coincidence, mere happenstance, like
bumping into the Guam witness or finding the Grasshof diary in an
illogical place ? Or was there a different and more sinister explanation ?
One Department of Justice lawyer who interviewed Roll at his Oakland,
California, home in the fall of 1937 obtained no information of sub-
stance.34
Investigations were broadened.35 The State Department file disclosed
that Roll's annual salary never exceeded $2500, that he had failed an
examination for permanent appointment in the consular service, and
that on his 1924 trip to Washington he had continued to California
before returning to Bremen. His income tax returns disclosed no source
of income additional to his salary. From former colleagues in the Bremen
consulate it was learned that he had an extravagant and demanding wife,
that he bought a car once he had returned from his American trip, and
that while at one time hostile to Hackfeld's position he later changed his
mind. The sum he had actually paid for his steamship passage was
ascertained, as was his round-trip transcontinental rail fare. When all
the digging and delving was completed, it was clear that Roll had received
money in connection with his 1924 trip. Only two more questions
needed to be put for information: (1) "How much was it?" (2) "Who
actually paid you ?"
In the spring of 1938, another Justice Department lawyer, accom-
panied by Special Agent O. H. Patterson of the F.B.I., went to Oakland
unannounced to interview Roll a second time; a sister said that he was
at a Sunday School meeting. This was helpful; a religious man is more
apt to speak the truth, and Roll's failed consular examination was
assurance that his was not an overpowering intellect.
Nonetheless, the basic problem remained: How does one induce any
individual, regardless of mentality or background, to admit having
improperly received money, even though such receipt occurred 14 years
earlier, and even though the payment may not have amounted to a
technical bribe ?
Next evening both men again went out to see Roll. Patterson advised
counsel not to dispute with Roll the first time he answered any question
incorrectly, but to let him complete the entire story of his trip before
venturing any contradiction. Then, while leaving the F.B.I.'s San
Francisco office, Patterson left there Roll's address and telephone
number, explaining in response to a question that this was rigidly
required routine. At counsel's suggestion, Patterson arranged to be
called at Roll's home after the visitors would have been there perhaps
thirty minutes.
Counsel opened the conversation by recalling the Hackfeld matter.
One by one, counsel showed him the laboriously collected documents
that were relevant to Hackfeld's citizenship. All were new to Roll and
shook him visibly; it became plain that he had had no idea whatever of
the truth about Hackfeld. Roll rejected only one document as irrelevant,
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a newspaper advertisement listing Hackfeld as a subscriber to a German
war charity in 1918.
While counsel and Roll sat side by side examining the documents
together, the telephone rang; Roll answered, then returned, saying with
some apprehension, "It's for you, Mr. Patterson."
Patterson made his side of the conversation easily audible to the other
two, still looking at papers.
"Yes, chief. Yes, sir, everything's coming along fine.
"No, chief, I don't think there'll be any difficulty.
"Yes, sir, I have that in mind, and I'll proceed on that basis if
necessary. But I don't think we'll need to go that far.
"Yes, chief, I understand. Yes, sir. Goodbye."
Roll blanched visibly, counsel with some difficulty kept a straight face.
Then, after all the documents had been examined and discussed, counsel
moved back to a chair facing Roll, and asked about his 1924 trip from
Bremen to the States.
Roll first said that his passage had been paid, that many steamship
companies did that for consular personnel. This was not the fact as to
the trip in question, but, obeying Patterson's instructions, counsel did
not interrupt, and simply took Roll all the way to Oakland and return,
reminding him that when he was once more back in Bremen he had
bought a new car. No, it was only a second-hand car; but yes, it was
new to him.
Counsel recalled Roll's financial position in 1924 and then put the
controlling question point-blank: "How were you able to swing that
trip from Bremen to California and return, and then buy a car and
support a wife and child on just $2500 a year? That's pretty fancy
financing. How did you do it?"
Roll swallowed hard and licked his lips nervously. "I will tell you."
And he did.
Shortly after he had made his original favorable report on Hackfeld,
Silliman visited Roll's Bremen home early one morning, and tendered
an envelope in appreciation of the way that Hackfeld's passport applica-
tion had been handled. Roll refused, saying he had simply done his duty.
Silliman said that if Roll ever changed his mind, the envelope would be
waiting for him in Hackfeld's Bremen office. Within a month or so, Roll
did change his mind, went to Hackfeld's office, and said he had come
for the envelope Silliman had earlier tendered. John Hackfeld went to
his safe, taking from it an envelope containing $1500 in American
currency. Without that money, Roll could not have made his trip to the
United States.
When Roll had finished telling his story, he was asked to write it out,
and he did so, in longhand. While engaged in that process, he added
the following:
When he arrived in Washington to make the required official call at
the State Department, Roll met Silliman in the building. (The Depart-
ment's files disclosed that Silliman advised those handling the Hackfeld
passport application that the Bremen Vice-Consul was in town.) Roll
then reported to the Department, where he made his second and
ultimately decisive report favorable to Hackfeld, and then had lunch
with Silliman. The latter then offered a second envelope. This time Roll
took it without discussion; it contained another $500 in currency.
Roll then swore to the truth of his statement before Patterson, and
appeared greatly relieved. As the two Government men were leaving,
counsel could not resist asking, "Why didn't you tell Mr. X about these
payments when he talked to you last fall?"
"Because he didn't ask me about them."
Roll came East twice to testify voluntarily, once in the Court of Claims
case in Washington, once before judge and jury in New York. On that
latter occasion, when Roll said on cross-examination that his actions
were not influenced "by any transaction that later was had by you with
Mr. Hackfeld," U.S. District Judge Alfred C. Coxe was quick to
intervene.
"You knew it was wrong, didn't you?"
Roll gulped. "Yes, I knew it was wrong."
There remained for investigation only the question of Hawaiian law
that the State Department had never properly examined in 1923-1924.
Citizenship under Hawaiian law. In the 1894 Constitution of the
Republic of Hawaii, under which certificates such as Hackfeld's were
authorized,36 issued by the Minister of the Interior, the holder was
"entitled, so long as he shall remain domiciled in the Republic, to all
the privileges of citizenship without thereby prejudicing his native
citizenship or allegiance." The Republic's Constitution accorded to
certificate holders a shorter process of naturalization than others,37 but
that instrument further provided that only the Supreme Court could
naturalize aliens,38 a step that required the applicant to abjure allegiance
to the government of his native land.39 Plainly, receipt of a Certificate
of Special Rights of Citizenship alone from the Minister of the Interior
could not possibly transform the recipient into a citizen of Hawaii.
The State Department lawyers dealt with the question as one of
American law, that is, whether acceptance of such a certificate by an
American citizen would disentitle him to diplomatic protection in the
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event that he later tangled with the Hawaiian authorities. So they relied
on American rulings denying such protection to one who had been
naturalized under the Monarchy's wholly different laws,40 and to another
who had been a denizen under the Republic.41 They never realized that
the real issue was one of Hawaiian law, namely, whether receipt of the
certificate, not followed by further steps, conferred Hawaiian nationality
on the certificate holder. Hence they never looked at the Hawaiian
Constitution, nor did they make any effort to examine the origins of that
document or the line of its growth.42
They were also unaware of the circumstance that, after 1900, when
the Organic Act conferred American citizenship on all citizens of
Hawaii, other holders of Certificates of Special Rights duly sought and
obtained American citizenship by individual naturalization proceedings.
In an ironic touch, this latter group included all three of Hackfeld &
Co.'s 1914-1918 Vice-Presidents, Rodiek, Humburg, and Hagens. Each
member of the trio had been issued the precise form of certificate on
which Hackfeld later rested his claim to have become an American
citizen. But, whereas each of the three Vice-Presidents had proceeded
to American naturalization, Rodiek indeed persisting after his first effect
had been set aside by a higher court,43 Hackfeld himself had only the
certificate.
The sum-total of the foregoing should have been conclusive. But as
Government counsel had been consistently unable after 1934 ever to
convince the State Department lawyers that they had earlier erred, the
Justice Department attorneys handling the Hawaiian litigation deemed
it essential to gild the lily, and to adduce still more support for their
contention that Hackfeld had remained a German national throughout.
The attorneys obtained the testimony of five distinguished Honolulu
lawyers, men of long judicial and executive experience going back to the
days of the kingdom, who said that it was the universal opinion of the
Hawaiian bar that Certificates of Special Rights of Citizenship did not
confer Hawaiian nationality.44 Their views were admissible in evidence
under an old Supreme Court case deciding that, in inquiries as to the
law of a former sovereign of what later became American soil, informa-
tion could properly be sought "from individuals whose official position
or pursuits have given them opportunities of acquiring knowledge."45
The Archives of Hawaii held a letter from President Sanford B. Dole of
the Republic of Hawaii confirming what the five Honolulu lawyers
had said.
Had the State Department lawyers in 1923-1924 undertaken their
evaluation of Hawaiian Certificates of Special Rights with more intellec-
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tual humility, had they properly appreciated that the question before
them turned on the constitution of what was then a foreign country, had
they applied the caution of Justice Holmes, who emphasized that to an
outsider foreign law is invariably "a wall of stone,"46 had they been less
willing to brush off with bureaucratic arrogance the contemporary
protests of a group of Honolulu lawyers over the issuance of the
Hackfeld passport that the files disclosed had been made,47 they would
not have made the error they did.
Had the lawyers in the Department of Justice in 1924 been less
trustful, they could then have discovered, doubtless more easily than
their successors did after Hackfeld was dead, all that was ultimately
uncovered more than ten years later. But, in Judge Learned Hand's
penetrating comment, "When the parties do not have equal means of
knowledge, it is immaterial that the victim, if more suspicious, could
have discovered the cheat."48
Still, when one considers the scope and the consummate artistry of
the fraud perpetrated by Hackfeld and Silliman in 1923-1924, to say
nothing of their corrupting of Vice-Consul Roll, one will not judge too
harshly the omissions of the earlier Government representatives.
The Hackfeld estate. There remain the two lawsuits involving the
Hackfeld estate.
The Court of Claims case had at first, in 1937, yielded a Commis-
sioner's report favorable to the Hackfeld interests, who thereupon,
perhaps because of doubts arising out of the mass of evidence submitted
by the Government, succeeded in getting a private Act of Congress
passed for their benefit. That measure would have struck down every
Government defense based on Hackfeld's lack of American citizenship
and on his fraud, and would have left open only the issue of valuation
that had earlier been adversely decided in California.
President Franklin D. Roosevelt, however, who was hostile on
principle to any private legislation that favored a single individual over
others similarly situated, vetoed the bill,49 and the delay Silliman had
obtained in anticipation of its signature was further extended. The
outcome in the Court of Claims then awaited the conclusion of the
cross-action in New York.
There, after 11 days of trial before a jury in the spring of 1939, Judge
Coxe directed a verdict in favor of the United States for over $1,600,000,
on the sole ground that John F. Hackfeld had as a matter of law never
been an American citizen. Further, the Hackfeld estate by seeking more
than President Coolidge's 1924 Executive Allowance had earlier allowed,
opened up for reexamination every phase of the original claim.50 Judge
35
Coxe thus determined that Chief Justices Charles Evans Hughes and
Harlan Fiske Stone had each committed an error of law in 1924.
The amount of the New York judgment against the Hackfeld estate
represented the difference between the 100% proceeds that John
Hackfeld had recovered as a purported American citizen and the 80%
that constituted the highest amount ever recoverable by former enemies
of German nationality,51 plus interest from date of receipt to date of
verdict. The Hackfeld estate's appeal was twice argued, because,
following the original presentation, Circuit Judge Robert P. Patterson
had become Assistant Secretary of War. Following the second argument,
the judgment below was affirmed.
When the Hackfeld estate then requested a rehearing for the dis-
allowance of interest, that step was denied in a helpful second opinion
which pointed out that the trial judge "did not regard the payments as
resulting from an entirely innocent mistake on the part of Hackfeld."
Finally, in 1942, with World War II raging, this case arising out of a
World War I property seizure had a further hearing, but before a
severely truncated Supreme Court.
Justices Murphy and Jackson, each of them a former Attorney
General, could not participate since in that capacity they had been
actual if nominal parties in the case. Nor could Chief Justice Stone
participate. The Chief Justice had recommended the 1924 Executive
Allowance, and had later been a deposition witness in the case to testify
that he had earlier been completely unaware of the true facts concerning
Hackfeld.52 The remaining six justices split three to three, which meant
that the judgments rendered in both courts below adverse to the Hackfeld
estate were affirmed and became final.
At this point the Court of Claims litigation finally went forwaid. By
then there had been a second report from the Commissioner, also adverse
to the Government; no matter; the Court of Claims brushed aside both
of his reports, and decided every issue against the Hackfeld estate. It
determined, as in the New York litigation, that Hackfeld had never in
his life been an American citizen. It made detailed findings that outlined
the frauds committed by and for Hackfeld. And it found as a fact that
Hackfeld had paid Roll $1500.
The Court of Claims did not determine whether Roll had received an
additional $500 from Silliman. But there is not the slightest reason to
suppose that the second payment was simply an incident invented by
Roll as he was writing out his confession in June 1938. Nearly two years
earlier, well before Government counsel had actual knowledge of any
payments to Roll and while testimony was still being taken before the
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Commissioner, Silliman had objected to the reception of a document
bearing a consular certification, commenting that "You have a higher
opinion of consuls than I have." Was this simply a gratuitous denigra-
tion? Or was his generalized deprecation of consuls based on his own
earlier dealings with Vice-Consul Roll?
Finally, the Court of Claims determined that the price paid by
American Factors for Hackfeld & Co. in 1918 was fair, and that no
higher price could have been obtained. Accordingly, the Court reported
to the Senate that the Hackfeld estate "has no claim, legal or equitable,
against the United States for the payment of any sum."
The J.C. Isenberg fraud. But the Hackfeld fraud was not the only one
perpetrated by a Silliman client. J. Carl Isenberg, the son of Noble Paul,
and a Hackfeld & Co. director who had been tossed out on his ear in
the January 1918 reorganization, also committed fraud.53
Living in Germany, J. Carl Isenberg made no move to recover his
seized property until 1923, when the Winslow Act's grudging allowance
of $10,000 capital and $10,000 annual income was made available to
German nationals. Five years later, after the Settlement of War Claims
Act permitted Germans to recover up to 80% of their seized property,54
he filed and was paid under that distinctly more generous provision.
Then, in 1931, he sought, and obtained (pursuant to an Executive
Allowance signed by President Hoover), the remaining 20% on the
representation that, by reason of birth in Lihue, Hawaii, which he had
always considered his true home he had become an American citizen
in 1900; that he had remained a citizen; and that he had never forsworn
that citizenship by any oath of allegiance to a foreign power.
As with the Hackfeld estate, J. Carl could not leave well enough
alone: he also filed a later suit seeking the difference between the full
proceeds already recovered by him, and the alleged true value of the
Hackfeld & Co. shares at the time of seizure. He of all persons could
perhaps most appropriately advance that tenet of the party line, not
because he had any personal knowledge of the facts—he had none,
never having set foot in Hawaii after a short visit there in 1898—but
because he had been the first-named claimant in the California litigation,
the strenuously contested case that appears in the law reports as Isenberg
v. Sherman.55
Here also, the United States filed a counterclaim once it had completed
its investigations. These showed that J. Carl was taken to Germany for
his education at the age of eight, and that, when his schoolmates were
ready for military service, he became a citizen of Bremen in order to
join them. His oath was recorded in the citizenship book of that ancient
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Hanseatic free city. His father bought him an estate in Holstein, his
own Hawaiian dividends assured continuing prosperity, and he was
commissioned a reserve officer in a Mecklenburg cavalry regiment, the
Ludwigsluster Dragoons.56
During World War I, J. Carl was the senior reserve officer in his
regiment, serving until 1916, when he was inactivated that he might
grow more foodstuffs for the Fatherland on his own broad acres. After
the war, he made several trips to the United States, each time on a
German passport; and he filed U.S. income tax returns, invariably as a
non-resident alien. But, whereas in passport and in tax matters and in
affidavits he furnished to other Alien Property claimants J. Carl was
uninterruptedly a German who resided in Holstein, for his own Alien
Property purposes he regularly represented himself as an American
domiciled at Lihue, Kauai. What added spice to this kaleidoscopic
metamorphosis was the circumstance that, in order to come to the
United States to swear to documents setting forth the latter contradictory
though potentially vastly more profitable statements, he stepped on
American soil by virtue of an American visa—which he had obtained by
asserting German nationality and German residence.
By the summer of 1939, the United States so far had the goods on
J. Carl that it moved for judgment on its counterclaim, a step that left
Government counsel wondering what response their quarry would make
when faced by the documentary blockbuster it had assembled. Would
he admit to being a German, his consistent position in the realm of
passports and tax returns ? Would he stonewall on his preferred stance
in his own Alien Property affairs, and reassert American citizenship plus
unswerving loyalty to the Stars and Stripes? J. Carl was equal to the
dilemma: he put forward dual nationality! He admitted the Bremen
naturalization, but insisted that, simultaneously, he had at all times been
a good American nonetheless.
A careful and experienced federal judge deemed the case against the
claimant so clearly established that there was nothing left to try; his
judgment in the Government's favor, which included a specific deter-
mination that the Executive Allowance had been obtained by fraud, was
duly affirmed on appeal.
RETRIBUTION—PHASE TWO
American law does not recognize dual citizenship in the sense of a
dual allegiance simultaneously owed.57 Just before J. Carl Isenberg
advanced the ploy of dual nationality in November 1939, Silliman
invoked the identical notion on behalf of John Hackfeld's New York
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executor. In April 1939, immediately after Judge Coxe had ruled against
the Hackfeld estate on the ground that Hackfeld had never as a matter
of law been an American citizen at any time, Silliman approached the
bench and said, "You know, Judge, Mr. Hackfeld always believed that
he had dual citizenship."58 If this was indeed the fact, no trace of any
such belief appeared in any of the numerous documents Hackfeld had
ever signed, either before or after November 1923. Nor had that
concept surfaced in any of the many briefs that Silliman had presented
to Government agencies and to courts from 1923 onward.
But, by 1939, it was far too late for criminal prosecution of Silliman
because he, along with Hackfeld, had defrauded the United States.
However, inasmuch as the New York assets of the Hackfeld estate, some
$900,000, were wholly insufficient to satisfy the $1,600,000 judgment
against it, a civil action was begun against Silliman in New Jersey federal
court to obtain the deficiency from him, charging that he and John
Hackfeld had been joint wrongdoers. In due course a jury rendered a
verdict against Silliman for somewhat over a million dollars, the amount
of the deficiency plus interest.59 Silliman appealed, urging that his
personal liability had already been rejected in another judicial proceed-
ing, and that this circumstance barred relitigation.
He pointed to a hearing before the Surrogate of New York County,
where, following Judge Coxe's adverse judgment, he had asked to be
paid counsel fees from the estate for his own services defending it—from
the consequences of the fraud he had himself concocted! Government
counsel, seeking to preserve the insufficient Hackfeld assets for the
benefit of the United States, argued volubly that the Surrogate should
not permit Silliman to profit by the very scheme to which he had been
a party. But the Surrogate allowed the fees nonetheless,60 and when the
personal judgment against Silliman was later reviewed on appeal, the
appellate tribunal held the Government barred from recovery by reason
of the Surrogate's earlier determination.61 A scholarly legal journal
deplored that result as untenable.62 But the Supreme Court, whose
caseload even 30 years ago did not permit it to review every erroneous
result reached by lower courts, let stand the ruling that set aside the
Government's million dollar judgment.63
Accordingly, Silliman escaped the first hook. The Government paused
to regroup, and then sent in the revenuers. The latter undertook an
examination of the way Silliman had dealt with the very substantial fees
that he had received from his Hackfeld and Isenberg clients for recover-
ing their seized property from the United States. There they struck
pay dirt.
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A provision in the Winslow Act of 1923 had limited counsel fees for
the recovery of seized property to 3% of the amounts recovered.64
Silliman had actually received fees totalling 13%, characterizing the
extra 10% as a gift, and charging all of his expenses against the lawful
3%. In consequence, he had understated his income by some $550,000
over the years 1924 to 1927, and underpaid his taxes by $232,000 in the
same period. The Tax Court found that his tax returns were accordingly
false and fraudulent and made with intent to evade tax. Silliman became
liable, not only for the unpaid taxes, but for the 50% fraud penalty in
addition, as well as for interest on the deficiency-plus-penalty for between
25 to 28 years. (There is no statute of limitations on fraudulent tax
returns, any more than there is on murder.) In all, this came to about
$925,000 owing to Uncle Sam. Appeals proved unavailing, the final one
failing in October 1955.65
At this point of obviously total financial ruin, the ordinary individual
would doubtless simply have taken to his bed and turned his face to the
wall. But the skillful originator of such many-splendored frauds was no
ordinary individual. Silliman did not give up the ghost until November
1961, well along into his 91st year.66
REFLECTION
What could possibly have induced Silliman to risk defrauding the
United States twice running on identical claims ? Did he deem himself
impregnably secure behind two executive allowances, by President
Coolidge in the case of Hackfeld and by President Hoover in that of
J. Carl Isenberg? Or had the passing years simply obliterated every
recollection of the means by which he had engineered and fabricated
those two recoveries ?
Silliman was not the only Alien Property claimants' lawyer who made
a similarly fatal miscalculation. In the American Metals case of the
Harding-Daugherty era, a Swiss corporation had sought recovery of
property seized by the Alien Property Custodian. If the company was
owned by Swiss nationals, it was entitled to full return; if however the
concern was German-owned, return was then still prohibited by law.
Company officials plied Custodian Miller—and others—with gifts,
Liberty Bonds, and cash, with the result that, within just two days after
receipt of a complex and lengthy claim, this Harding appointee deter-
mined the concern to be genuinely Swiss. It therefore obtained nearer to
seven than six million dollars, whereupon, all in due course, prison gates
clanged shut on Miller.67
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Some years later, it was ruled that former non-German enemies who
had recovered seized property were entitled to all interest that had been
earned on such property while it remained in the Custodian's hands.68
Thereupon the same Swiss company whose officers had corrupted Miller
had the effrontery to ask for interest on the principal sum that it had
earlier so dishonestly obtained. Its request was, understandably, treated
by the Department of Justice as too hot to handle; Attorney General
William Mitchell told the claimants that they would have to take it to
court. Nothing daunted, the Swiss company did just that—and there
wound up on the receiving end of a cross-judgment for well over 13
million dollars, made up of the principal sum earlier obtained by bribing
Miller, plus, necessarily, over 15 years' interest at 6% per annum on
top of that.69
Yet, and here is the deadly parallel with Silliman's imprudence, the
very same New York lawyer who commenced that fateful proceeding
had in actual fact been present in Switzerland in October 1918, where,
with the permission of the War Trade Board, he had dealt personally
with the true German owners of the Swiss company! Hence if there was
anyone in all of the United States who knew full well that the Swiss
concern was indeed German-owned, it was this lawyer—despite which
this identical individual signed and swore to the first papers in the
lawsuit that ultimately ruined his client.70 Once again, the lapse of time
had eradicated all memory of the earlier but still crucial facts.
In all these instances, the individuals concerned met ultimate disaster
because the censorship of their unconscious had wiped out every
recollection either of their own personal misconduct, or of their own
prior knowledge of facts fatal to the claims that they later asserted.
Somewhat similar functioning of the human mind underlay the
persistently pursued mirage of the former Hackfeld & Co. stockholders
who contended again and again that their shares had been grossly
undervalued in 1918. As to some, not present in Honolulu after Rodiek's
guilty plea and the revelations of the Grasshof diary had combined to
drive the company to the brink of ruin, their position represented simply
a form of wishful thinking, mere nostalgic recollection of the halcyon
days when Hackfeld & Co. stood in the van of the Big Five, regularly
paying out fat cash dividends as though it were a branch of the United
States mint. One minor functionary, confronted on cross-examination
with the query, "Isn't it the fact that, as you get farther and farther away
from 1918, the value of Hackfeld & Co. stock seems always higher to
you?", actually answered "Yes."71 (But he was only reflecting the views
of his superiors. In the California litigation, begun in 1924, the former
stockholders had asserted that the true value of their company was, not
the $7,500,000 for which it had been sold, but $17,500,000. But before
the sequel Court of Claims proceeding terminated, in 1943, the worth
claimed for Hackfeld & Co. had nearly doubled; by then John Hackfeld's
estate contended that it was actually $30,000,000.)
For others, who had indeed been present in Hawaii or in California
at the critical time, notably Humburg and Rodiek, the unpleasant facts
were simply forgotten—to be remembered again only when inconsistent
writings over their signatures made them writhe in the witness chair.
So far indeed did their unconscious blot out the hateful past that Von
Damm, testifying on deposition in 1938 and being shown the front page
headlines of the Honolulu newspapers that had so shocked readers with
the revelations of Captain Grasshof's souvenir booklet, professed not to
remember at all those events of November 1917. His lapse was, without
question, genuine; although on the next day, doubtless after a largely
sleepless night, Von Damm's memory broke through the mental filters
that were shielding him from the nightmare days of twenty years before.72
Indeed, the only completely truthful man in the entire Hackfeld hui
was J. F. Carl Hagens. He called the shots as he saw them, and as they
happened, and refused to join the other stockholders in their California
lawsuit. By way of reward for his integrity, they sued him as an additional
defendant. For all of them except Hagens, the whole matter was an
instance of believing, as surely most persons do, only what they wanted
to believe.
In the end, therefore, the doings of Silliman, of Hackfeld, and of all
the other ousted Hackfeld & Co. stockholders, simply illustrate in
slightly varying fashion the curtains that with unfailing regularity efface
all unpleasantness of prior days. This is a recognized phenomenon, first
brought to public attention at the turn of the century by Sigmund Freud,
who then documented with a host of examples the universal proposition
that every instance of forgetfulness is motivated and triggered by some
impulse of dislike or displeasure.73
So much for the personal, psychological aspects of the complex story
just detailed; it is now appropriate to consider that narrative's signifi-
cance in the history of the State of Hawaii.
Wartime seizures of enemy property could easily be justified as a
measure necessary during hostilities. But, once the war fervor of
1917-1918 had subsided and the euphoric period of the mid-1920s
arrived, with the Locarno Pact of 1925 and the admission of Germany
into the League of Nations the following year,74 it seemed cruel to many
that Custodian A. Mitchell Palmer had administered the Trading with
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the Enemy Act with the objective of expunging German influence and
German capital everywhere in the United States and its overseas
territories, not only while the First World War continued, but forever.
In the retrospect of more than half a century, one may well take a
different view. Suppose that German-owned property had simply been
held in custody and not sold, and that after the peace it had then been
returned in kind to its former owners. In that event, following the advent
of the Nazis in 1933, the then German Government would have had a
spy network centered in Hawaii, one that would plainly have put into
the shade the distinctly small-time World War I activities of Consul
George Rodiek, of Captain Grasshof, and of the skipper of Cormoran at
Guam. And that Nazi network, once Japan joined the Axis in September
1940,75 would have operated side by side with the Nipponese intelligence
apparatus headquartered in Japan's Honolulu consulate-general, the
same that in the event contributed so significantly to the American
disaster at Pearl Harbor.76
Consequently, from the vantage point of 20-20 hindsight sixty years
later, it was indeed fortunate for the United States that Alien Property
Custodian A. Mitchell Palmer took such a hard line position in 1918, and
that he succeeded in removing from Hawaii for the foreseeable future
every vestige of German capital and influence.
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